Loss of a Yankee SSBN, the K-219 accident
by Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) Igor Kurdin, Russian Navy and
Lt. Cmdr. Wayne Grasdock, USN
During the Cold War, as the United States military trained primarily to fight and win major theater wars, the country as a whole pursued a strategy of containing the Soviet Union and the seven satellite nations in Eastern Europe who signed the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance in Warsaw on May 15, 1955. Led by men like First Secretary Josef Stalin, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, and Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, the Soviet Union pursued the development of a modern and innovative fleet. By 1986, the Soviets had amassed a Navy that Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman described as follows:
What is particularly disturbing about the “fleet that Gorshkov built” is that improvements in its individual unit capabilities have taken place across broad areas. Submarines are faster, quieter, and have better sensors and self-protection. Surface ships carry new generations of missiles and radars. Aircraft have greater endurance and payloads. And the people who operate this Soviet concept of a balanced fleet are ever better trained and confident.1
Achieving this modern and innovative fleet, however, did not come without some significant costs. The Cold War was the most demanding national security challenge the Soviet Union faced since World War II. It dominated strategy, force planning, and defense budgets for nearly half a century. Although the personal costs – both mental and physical – are more difficult to assess, this article provides an interesting anecdote that portrays that aspect of one costly Cold War incident.
Captain Second Rank Igor A. Britanov, Russian Navy, was the Commanding Officer of RPK-SN K-219, a 667A Project boat (known in the West as a Yankee-class ballistic missile submarine), which suffered a major accident in the Atlantic Ocean. The incident onboard K-219, an explosion and subsequent fire in missile tube No. 6, occurred approximately 600 miles east of Bermuda in October of 1986. The Soviet Union claimed that the incident was due to a collision with a U.S. submarine. Captain Britanov says, “There was no collision.”2
Although the book Hostile Waters, published in 1997, is based on the true story of K-219, this article is a more accurate technical representation of what took place – it leaves out the “Hollywood” aspects and describes the heroic efforts of a crew attempting to save a submarine.3 Despite the attempts of the officers and crew to gain more recognition, only one sailor, who died in the reactor compartment, received an award. This decoration and the facts of the incident are not spoken of in Russia. Captain Britanov states that in the eyes of his government, there were no heroes on K-219. When asked the number of times he is called to be a guest lecturer at Russian functions, he simply states, “None – I do not tell the story the way my government wants me to tell it. I did not collide with an American sub.”4
Two issues are of particular interest in this account. One of these is readiness. Resource limitations and the continuing, demanding requirement for increasingly frequent submarine patrols and deployments during the Cold War literally stretched the Soviet submarine force to the breaking point. This article will show that the Soviets had an inadequate force for the missions they attempted to accomplish.
The second issue is safety. In the U.S. Submarine Force, there is a major emphasis on this aspect of operations at all times, almost to the point where constant checking seems like micromanagement. Keeping the ship and men safe is always priority one. This was much less true in the Soviet submarine force. Perhaps the incident on K-219 would not have occurred if one more person had checked the last maintenance performed on missile tube No. 6.
The Homeland Said, “You Must”
A rare photo of a Soviet Delta IV heading out to sea along the Kola Peninsula, home of the Northern Fleet. Due to its strategic location, the Kola Peninsula was the primary basing area for the largest concentration of Soviet nuclear-powered surface and submarine forces.
According to plan, RPK-SN K-219 went to sea on an operational mission on Sept. 4, 1986. The boat's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Igor Anatolyevich Britanov, was an experienced submariner, who had earned the right to command an SSBN independently in 1981. The cruise was his third as a commander and his thirteenth as an officer. This time, however, he was not commanding his usual ship. Onboard K-219, watch was kept by the first crew of K-241, which included 31 officers, 38 michmen (Warrant Officers), and 49 seamen. The crew was brought up to full strength with first-class specialists.
At that time, cruise training had never been so chaotic. The Cold War was ongoing, and the Soviet Navy – plus the Strategic Rocket Forces – bore the brunt of the two superpowers’ nuclear standoff. The Soviet Union’s response to the American deployment of Pershing ICBMs and cruise missiles on the front line in Europe was to build up the forces of the VMF (Navy) of the USSR, and to extend RPK-SN patrolling up to the immediate shore of the United States. Thus, the number of deterrent patrols for RPK-SNs rose to two or three each year. The ships had reached the limit of their capabilities, and the repair base was far from adequate for the fleet’s new tasks. For Soviet submarines, several operational cruises each year, unused leave, and muddled training all became the norm. Under the pressure of these conditions, senior commanders had to close their eyes to the fact that non-proficient crews were going out to sea on unfamiliar boats. Discussion of crew proficiency and cohesiveness was not allowed.
An analysis of the K-219 personnel roster reveals that in the course of cruise training, 11 of the 31 staff officers had been replaced, including the chief executive officer, the executive officer, the missile (BCh-2) officer, the torpedo (BCh-3) officer, and the chief of the radio-engineering service (RTS). A similar situation existed among the michmen. Sixteen of the 38 michmen had been replaced, including both of the BCh-2 petty officers. This analysis is not to criticize Rear Admiral N.N. Malov, who was Chief of Staff for the 19th RPK-SN Division, which was responsible for crew assignments. At that time, on orders from above, he brought five strategic underwater missile carriers into operational duty.
Why did the Captain agree to go out to sea unprepared, on a boat that was unfamiliar to him, and with a crew that included personnel unknown to him? Because if Britanov had refused, he would have been replaced by someone else. Let us turn to the events of Oct. 3, 1986.
Explosion in Missile Tube No. 6
After 30 days at sea, K-219 moved into its designated patrol area in the Sargasso Sea in the North Atlantic. At 0456, on Oct. 3, the submarine came to periscope depth for routine communications. Five minutes later, it began a descent to 85 meters. At the time, the GEhU (electric plant) was operating in one-echelon mode, and the capacity of the starboard reactor was at 30 percent; the port reactor had been suppressed/damped by all the absorbers, and the steam production plant (PPU) and the turbine were ready for operation; the starboard turbine operated the screw, and the port shaft line was ready to operate the propulsion motor.
At 0514, the BCh-2 officer and the hold machinist/engineer in compartment IV (the forward missile compartment) discovered water dripping from under the plug of missile tube No. 6 (the third tube from the bow on the port side). During precompression of the plug, the drips turned into a stream. The BCh-2 officer reported water in missile tube No. 6, and at 0525, the Captain ordered an ascent to a safe depth (46 meters) while a pump was started in an attempt to dry out missile tube No. 6. At 0532, brown clouds of oxidant began issuing from under the missile-tube plug, and the BCh-2 officer declared an accident alert in the compartment and reported the situation to the GKP (main control station). Although personnel assigned to other compartments left the space, nine people remained in compartment IV. The Captain declared an accident alert. It took the crew no more than one minute to carry out initial damage control measures, which included hermetically sealing all compartments. Five minutes later, at 0538, an explosion occurred in missile tube No. 6.
Damage Control
Black smoke appeared in compartment IV, followed by water mixed with rocket fuel from the destroyed pipes in the upper part of the missile tube. The Captain quickly gave the order for an emergency ascent to the surface. Initial inspection of the boat revealed the following damage: a high level of gas in compartment IV, about 4.5 tons of water in the bilge of that compartment, and temporary loss of status information on the missiles in the other tubes. Other systems on board also suffered damage. The submarine’s Kashtan loudspeaker communications system was knocked out, as well as the Kashtan systems for compartments IV and V (aft missile). The R-651 radio transmitter was practically knocked out. Indicators and lights in the compartments were smashed. In the superstructure, the high pressure air line was damaged. The GEhU control panel indicated that on the port side, the direct-current 220-volt power supply was inoperative, the automatic valves that supply feed water to the steam generators on the port side had opened, and the independent tertiary-circuit valves were open. The Kama electro-energy system console indicated that the insulation resistance of the electrical systems on both the port and starboard sides was zero. By command of the GKP, lines of defense were established in compartment II (control station) and missile compartment V, and compressed air backpressure was created in these compartments.
At 0610, personnel in compartments V and VI (the auxiliary machinery compartment) were transferred to compartment VIII (the forward turbine space). Seven minutes later, a report came from missile compartment IV that it was impossible to remain there because of the large amount of gas and the high temperature. The Captain ordered compartment V to prepare to receive personnel from missile compartment IV. At 0635, personnel were withdrawn from compartment IV, but three crewmembers stayed behind, including the BCh-2 officer. The electrical (BCh-5) officer ordered that the port GEhU begin operating.
After the withdrawal of personnel from compartment IV, at 0645, a two-person damage-control party was sent to compartment IV to appraise the situation and help the three crewmembers that remained there. Because of the great amount of smoke, the party could not locate the BCh-2 officer or conduct a detailed examination of missile tube No. 6. The bodies of seamen I.K. Kharchenko and N.L. Smaglyuk were removed from the compartment.
At 0725, with the boat on the surface, ventilation of compartments IV, V, and VI into the atmosphere began. At daybreak, the senor executive officer examined missile tube No. 6 from the top of the fairwater planes. The tube cover was gone, the rocket head was not visible, and the cover shaft was opened to the side. The outer hull structure around the tube was damaged. The shield-fairing to the covers of tubes 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 were torn away and hanging overboard. The missile deck around tube No. 6 was deformed, trickling brown smoke.
The following questions were directed to Captain
2nd Rank (Ret.) Igor Britanov on Aug. 4, 1998.
Q: Your reactor design allows for the manual insertion of control rods, why?
A: In Russia, we consider it the last method.
Q: Could the ship have been saved if there were more breathing devices?
A: That is a difficult question…maybe.
Q: What role did the Political Officer play during the incident?
A: No role at all. The Political Officer is a position filled by a government agent who has no knowledge of any technical aspects of the ship. They are onboard to serve political purposes only. We usually do not get along with them.
Q: How many crewmembers died?
A: Four. Three in the missile compartment due to the explosion and toxic gas release and one in the reactor compartment. The gas was very corrosive. It was deteriorating metal, think what it would do to your lungs.
Q: The sailor in the reactor compartment who manually shut down the starboard reactor, did he die from radiation sickness?
A: No, it was heat stress. He was wearing a rubber suit and it was about 130 degrees in the reactor compartment.
Q: What is an important lesson from this incident?
A: Take care of your people, and they will take care of you.
Q: Over time, did you find your work at finding U.S. submarines harder or easier?
A: It is always difficult to find another submarine, especially American submarines.
At 0851, two members of the damage control party were sent to compartment IV for a second time. The level of toxic gas in the compartment was lower, visibility had improved, and water stopped flowing from the upper part of tube No. 6. The party found the lifeless body of the BCh-2 officer, Captain 3rd Rank A.V. Petrachkov. His body, gas analysis equipment, and ISZ (damage control equipment) were removed from compartment IV.
At 0925, the port GEhU began operating. The starboard and port PPUs were operating with starboard capacity at 30 percent, and port capacity at 50 percent. The Captain made the decision to discharge the oxidant and water in the tube. To accomplish this, he briefed an additional four groups from BCh-2 and BCh-5, and sent them to compartment IV. All attempts to pump the tube produced vapor clouds of oxidant and water. Water mist began to inundate the compartment’s electrical equipment, including the switchboards. This caused short circuits in the switchboards, which started a fire. The fire consumed the electrical equipment, and the pumps stopped. The GKP ordered the damage control party to leave compartment IV.
At 1754, the GKP decided to introduce Freon from the fire-smothering station (LOKh) in compartment III into compartment IV. However, because the supply pipe was leaking and some of the Freon began to enter compartment III, that attempt was secured. The composition of the atmosphere in compartment III began to deteriorate, with the amount of nitrogen oxides exceeding the permissible limit does by 10 to 40 times. Personnel were forced to abandon the communications post and the coded communications post, and all radio communications were lost. A routine dispatch about the situation on the submarine could not be transmitted, and a radio telegram from the Commander of the Soviet Fleet with recommendations for damage control was not received.
At 1840, in order to inspect compartment V, the bulkhead door connecting compartment IV and compartment V was opened. The great deal of smoke in compartment V was mistaken for a fire, and the GKP ordered that Freon be introduced into that space from the LOKh station in compartment VI.
At 1930, due to the loss of the 50-hertz, 380 volt power supply on the starboard side, the starboard reactor’s emergency shielding was activated. The reactor compensating lattices did not go down to the lower rear switches.
Twenty minutes later, personnel in compartment VII (the reactor compartment) reported to the GKP that there was smoke in the lower region of compartment VI. The compartment was abandoned. The bulkhead flapper valves between compartments V and VI did not close, and personnel crossed into compartment VIII. About this time, the pressure in the marine hydraulic system fell to zero. In order to secure the starboard reactor, BCh-5 specialists (senior Lieutenant N.N. Belikov and Seaman S.A. Preminin) were sent into the reactor room in compartment VII, three separate times, in an attempt to lower the reactor compensating lattices manually. Belikov lost consciousness but Preminin continued to work. At the same time, by command of the GKP, compartments VIII, IX (the aft turbine compartment), and X (the end compartment) were ventilated to the outside, and the pressure in these compartments fell to atmospheric pressure. However, because the pressure in compartment VII remained elevated in relation to that of compartment VIII, personnel in VIII could not open the bulkhead door connecting VII and VIII. The vacuum system in the lower region of VIII was turned on to try to equalize pressure, but this was stopped when brown smoke began coming out of the piping. The GKP ordered Preminin to try to open compartment VII’s ventilation system flapper valve in order to lower the pressure in VII, but Preminin was no longer able to do this. Nor could the damage control team form the other side of the compartment. Further questioning from the GKP elicited no response from Preminin.
At 2130, the MMF (International Naval Fleet) vessels Fyodor Bredikhin, Krasnovardeysk, and Bakarisa, set out for the area where the accident had occurred.
At 2300, according to personnel reports, the atmospheric conditions in the affected compartments continued to degrade. The ISZs depleted all breathing devices,and the temperature of the bulkhead between compartments III and IV was rising. Based on the information he had available, the Captain assumed that there were fires in compartments IV, V, and VI; that VII was pressurized and not accessible; and that there could be fires in compartments VII, VIII, IX, and X. Given that the resources of the ISZ had been exhausted and that the (assumed) fires in compartments IV and V could cause missiles to explode, the Captain decided to take the port reactor off line and to prepare to evacuate personnel to the MMF vessels.
Evacuation of personnel was completed at 0100 on Oct. 4. After evacuation of the bow and conning tower, the stern hatches were closed and battened down. The Captain and six officers remained in command on the bridge.
At 0146, the TsKP (central command post) of the VMF received a report from Captain Britanov via KP (command post) of the MMF: “Fire in all the compartments, no motion. Six men on the submarine. Large fires in the holds of compartments IV and V. The Captain awaits the order to abandon ship.”
At 2245, a damage control party commanded by the Chief Executive Officer embarked on the submarine and surveyed compartments I, II, and III. These compartments were dry, the pressure was normal, and emergency lighting was on. In addition, the accumulator battery had been partially discharged. The pressure in the high pressure air system had fallen to half the normal pressure, and the hydraulic system showed no pressure at all. The boat’s pressure hull above compartments IV and VII was warm, possibly due to residual thermal separations in the reactor. The air pressure and hull temperature in the area of the other compartments was the same as ambient. The bulkhead between compartments III and IV was cold up to the upper edge.
The damage-control party corrected the trim by blowing the TsGB (main ballast tanks) in the bow and began preparing the submarine for towing. The party did not examine the stern compartments because the stern hatch had been flooded. The party suspended its work and left the submarine.
Sinking of the Submarine
At dawn on Oct. 5, the damage control party continued to prepare the submarine for towing. At 1815, the motor vessel Krasnovardeysk began towing the crippled submarine. However, the submarine’s draft and bow trim slowly continued to increase, and the next morning at 0620, the towing cable snapped, and the bow and stern hatches were submerged. The damage-control party was not able to descend to compartment III because the lower conning tower hatch was jammed. The submarine continued to lose buoyancy. When it was submerged to the level of the superstructure deck, the damage control party left. By 1100, the submarine had submerged to the level of the fairwater planes, and the GK (commander in chief) of the VMF ordered the Captain to abandon ship. At 1102 on Oct. 6, 1986 the K-219 sank.
The Investigation
The sinking of K-219 led to a criminal investigation that lasted nearly a year.
The Captain, the deputy political officer, and the BCh-5 officer were discharged for
failure to perform their duties properly. Of all the officers and crew, only Seaman S.A. Preminin received an award: the Order of the Red Star (posthumously), and by decree No. 844 of the President of the Russian Federation on Aug. 7, 1997, Seaman Preminin was named a Hero of the Russian Federation.
The special commission’s investigation established the following:
1. The cause of the missile accident in tube No. 6 was flooding in the tube. The seawater destroyed the missile casing and caused rocket fuel chemicals to enter the tube. The tube cover’s rack and pinion device had not been undogged and caused an increase in pressure and the explosion. This in turn caused the rocket fuel components to ignite and burn. The reason why seawater was able to enter the tube was not established.
2. The diffusion of nitrogen oxides from compartment IV, and introduction of dangerous gases into the stern compartments was caused by multiple trips made by the damage control parties to compartment VI for the purpose of inspection, rendering assistance, ventilation, and pumping water and oxidant out of the missile tube. Water mist and oxidants caused short circuits in switchboards No. 7 and No. 8, which led to a fire.
3. Due to the uncontrolled entry of seawater into compartment IV, the submarine lost longitudinal stability, buoyancy, and sank. Missile tube No. 6, which was non-pressurized, was open to the sea to through the outboard valves that remained open. This caused compartment IV to flood. Compartments V and VI were filled from compartment IV through the open ventilation flapper valves.
Afterthoughts
The replacement – on short notice – of a large percentage of crewmembers on K-219 led to tragic consequences. Unfortunately, this was not uncommon in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. On June 23, 1983, K-429 conducted a weapons firing check that cost the lives of 16 crewmembers and resulted in the sinking of the submarine. Of the 120 crewmembers onboard only 43 were regular crew, and the others came from five different submarine crews.
The U.S. Navy has issued the following statement regarding the release of the book Hostile Waters and an HBO movie of the same name, based on the incidents surrounding the casualty of the Russian Yankee submarine (K-219) off the Bahamas in Oct. 1986:
“The United States Navy normally does not comment on submarine operations, but in this case, because the scenario is so outrageous, the Navy is compelled to respond.
The United States Navy categorically denies that any U.S. submarine collided with this Russian Yankee submarine (K-219) or that the Navy had anything to do with the cause of the casualty that resulted in the loss of the Russian Yankee submarine.” 5
Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) Igor Kurdin, Russian Navy, served as the Executive Officer on K-219, from 1983 to 1986. He also has served as the Commanding Officer of Yankee and Delta class submarines.
Lt. Cmdr. Wayne Grasdock, USN, served as Navigator on USS Philadelphia (SSN-690) from 2000 to 2004, and is currently assigned to the Pentagon. Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) Kurdin and Lt. Cmdr. Grasdock published a similar article with the Naval Submarine League in 2000.
Those who helped translate articles and conversations were: Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) Igor Kozyr, Russian Navy; Lieutenant Commander (Ret.) Igor Fyodorov, Russian Navy; and Professor Georgine DiVirgilio, U.S. Naval Academy.
1. Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988), ii.
2. Captain Igor A. Britanov, interview by Lt. Cmdr. Wayne Grasdock. Aug. 5, 1998.
3. Britanov, interview by Grasdock. Aug. 5, 1998.
4. Britanov, interview by Grasdock. Aug. 5, 1998.
5. U.S. Navy, “Hostile Waters”, <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/questions/hostlh2o.html>,
(Oct. 14, 2005).
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